Share This Paper. Background Citations. Methods Citations. Results Citations. Citation Type. Has PDF. Publication Type. More Filters. A logical form for the propositional attitudes.
The author puts forth an approach to propositional attitude contexts based upon the view that one does not have beliefs of ordinary extensional entitiessimpliciter. Rather, one has beliefs of such … Expand. Opacity in the Attitudes. Philosophical logic has its problem-children; and among these the Principle of Substitutivity of codesignating expressions the linguistic spawn of Leibniz's Law has achieved a place of prominence.
It … Expand. Ortcutt is no spy. Both of the component 'that'-clauses are indeed about the man Ortcutt; but the 'that' must be viewed in 12 and 13 as sealing those clauses off, thereby rendering 12 and 13 compatible because not, as wholes, about Ortcutt at all.
What goes by the board, when we rule 12 and 13 both true, is just 7. Yet we are scarcely prepared to sacrifice the relational construction 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy,' which 7 as against 8 was supposed to reproduce.
The obvious next move is to try to make the best of our dilemma by distinguishing two senses of belief: belief,, which disallows l l , and belief,, which tolerates 11 but makes sense of 7. For belief,, accordingly, we sustain 12 - 13 and ban 7 as nonsense. For belief,, on the other hand, we sustain 7 ; and for this sense of belief we must reject 13 and acquiesce in the con2 See From a Logical Point of View Harvard University Press, , pp.
But there is a more suggestive treatment. Beginning with a single sense of belief, viz. Intensions are creatures of darkness, and I shall rejoice with the reader when they are exorcised, but first I want to make certain points with help of them. Now intensions named thus by 'that7-clauses, without free variables, I shall speak of more specifically as intensions of degree 0, or propositions. I n addition I shall for the moment recognize intensions of degree 1, or attributes.
These are to be named by prefixing a variable to a sentence in which it occurs free; thus z z is a spy is spyhood. Similarly we may specify intensions of higher degrees by prefixing multiple variables. Now just as we have recognized a dyadic relation of belief between a believer and a proposition, thus: 14 Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy, so we may recognize also a triadic relation of belief among a believer, an object, and an attribute, thus: 15 Ralph believes z z is a spy of Ortcutt.
For reasons which will appear, this is to be viewed not as dyadic belief between Ralph and the proposition that Ortcutt has z z is a spy , but rather as an irreducibly triadic relation among the three things Ralph, z z is a spy , and Ortcutt. Similarly there is tetradic belief: 16 Tom believes yz y denounced z of Cicero and Catiline, and so on. Now we can clap on a hard and fast rule against quantifying into propositional-attitude idioms; but we give it the form now of a rule against quantifying into names of intensions.
Thus, though 7 as it stands becomes unallowable, we can meet the needs which prompted 7 by quantifying rather into the triadic belief construction, thus : Ex [Ralph believes z z is a spy of x].
Hereafter we can adhere uniformly to this narrow sense of belief, both for the dyadic case and for triadic and higher; in each case the term which names the intension whether proposition or attribute or intension of higher degree is to be looked on as referentially opaque. The situation 11 is thus excluded. At the same time the effect of belief, can be gained, simply by ascending from dyadic to triadic belief as in For 15 does relate the men Ralph and Ortcutt precisely as belief, was intended to do.
Similarly, whereas from : Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline we cannot conclude : Tom believes that Tully denounced Catiline, on the other hand we can conclude from: Tom believes y y denounced Catiline of Cicero that Tom believes y y denounced Catiline of Tully, and also that 3x CTom believes y y denounced Catiline of 18 From 16 , similarly, we may infer that XI.
Our names of intensions, and these only, are what count as referentially opaque. Let us sum up our findings concerning the seven numbered statements about Ralph. Another that is true is: 20 Ralph believes that the man seen a t the beach is not a spy, which of course must not be confused with Under the terms of our illustrative story, 14 happens to be false; but 20 is true, and it leads by exportation to: 21 Ralph believes z z is not a spy of the man seen a t the beach. The man at the beach, hence Ortcutt, does not receive reference in 20 , because of referential opacity; but he does in 21 , so we may conclude from 21 that 22 Ralph believes z z is not a spy of Ortcutt.
Thus 15 and 22 both count as true. This is not, however, to charge Ralph with contradictory beliefs. Such a charge might reasonably be read into : 23 Ralph believes z z is a spy. It hardly needs be said that the barbarous usage illustrated in 15 - 19 and 21 - 23 is not urged as a practical reform. It is put forward by way of straightening out a theoretical difficulty, which, summed up, was as follows: Belief contexts are referentially opaque; therefore it is prima facie meaningless to quantify into them at least with respect to persons or other extensional objects ; how then to provide for those indispensable relational statements of belief, like 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy'?
Let it not be supposed that the theory which we have been examining is just a matter of allowing unbridled quantification into belief contexts after all, with a legalistic change of notation.
On the contrary, the crucial choice recurs at each point: quantify if you will, but pay the price of accepting situations of the type 11 with respect to each point at which you choose to quantify. In other words: distinguish as you please between referential and non-referential positions, but keep track, so as to treat each kind appropriately. The notation of intensions, of degree one and higher, is in effect a device for inking in a boundary between referential and non-referential occurrences of terms.
Striving and wishing, like believing, are propositional attitudes and referentially opaque. Thus, just as 7 gave way to 17 , so 3 and 4 give way to: 24 3x Cx is a lion. I wish z I have z of 25 a certain breach of idiom being allowed for the sake of analogy in the case of 'strives. Observing in 3 - 4 the quantification into opaque contexts, then, we might have retreated to 1 - 2 and foreborne to paraphrase them into terms of striving and wishing.
For 1 - 2 were quite straightforward renderings of lion-hunting and sloopwanting in their relational senses; it was only the notional senses that really needed the breakdown into terms of striving and wishing, 5 - 6.
Actually, though, it would be myopic to leave the relational senses of lion-hunting and sloop-wanting at the unanalyzed stage 1 - 2. For, whether or not we choose to put these over into terms of wishing and striving, there are other relational cases of wishing and striving which require our consideration anyway -as witness 9.
The untenable formulations 3 - 4 may indeed be either corrected as 24 - 25 or condensed back into 1 2 ; on the other hand we have no choice but to correct the untenable 9 on the pattern of 24 - 25 , viz.
The untenable versions 3 - 4 and 9 all had to do with wishing and striving in the relational sense. We see in contrast that 5 - 6 and l o , on the notional side of wishing and striving, are innocent of any illicit quantification into opaque contexts from outside. But now notice that exactly the same trouble begins also on the notional side, as soon as we try to say not just that Ernest hunts lions and I want a sloop, but that someone hunts lions or wants a sloop.
This move carries us, ostensibly, from 5 - 6 to : 26 3w Cw strives that 3x x is a lion. We know how, with help of the attribute apparatus, to put 26 - 27 in order; the pattern, indeed, is substantially before us in 24 - For concreteness I have been discussing belief primarily, and two other propositional attitudes secondarily: striving and wishing. The treatment is, we see, closely parallel for the three; and it will pretty evidently carry over to other propositional attitudes hope, fear, surprise.
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